Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 4

Article 11

2012

Baker v. Carr, the Census, and the Political and Statistical
Geography of the United States: The Origin and Impact of Public
Law 94-171
Margo Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Margo Anderson, Baker v. Carr, the Census, and the Political and Statistical Geography of the United
States: The Origin and Impact of Public Law 94-171, 62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1153 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol62/iss4/11

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

BAKER V. CARR, THE CENSUS, AND
THE POLITICAL AND STATISTICAL
GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC
LAW 94-171
Margo Anderson†
An absurd but fundamental incongruence exists in most states
between census geography and political electoral geography.
That is, the Bureau of Census requires that census tracts,
enumeration districts, and blocks all follow “easily
recognizable” boundaries such as roads, rivers, and perhaps
transmission lines and aqueducts, but not “invisible” property
and political lines.
Richard Morrill, 19811
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of Baker v. Carr,2 it is
hard to overestimate the impact of the decision. Ending as it did fifty
years of massive malapportionment in legislative assemblies
throughout the United States, it led to a raft of successor decisions
and a domino effect of unanticipated political changes, which were in
turn amplified by the passage of the Voting Rights Act3 three years
later in 1965.
†
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Professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
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Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa–6 (2006).
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My task here, as historian and longtime observer of the federal
statistical system, is twofold. First I give some historical context on
the numerical issues implicit in the mandate of Article 1, section 2,
paragraph 3 of the federal Constitution4 and the “one person, one
vote” standard.5 Second, I examine the impact of the new standard on
the federal statistical system, particularly the decennial census used to
apportion and redistrict legislative seats each decade.
I. IT’S ALL ABOUT NUMBERS
A. Constitutional Origins of the Census
In the summer of 1787, slightly more than a decade after the
thirteen colonies had declared their independence from Great Britain,
several dozen men met at Philadelphia to try to improve the existing
American national government structure.6 War had ended in 1783 and
the infant nation had returned to peace. Yet severe political and
economic problems plagued the country. The Articles of
Confederation, finally ratified in 1781 as the framework for the
national government, had not been functioning well for a number of
years. By the late 1780s, the states were willing to send delegates to
discuss amendments. There were many different proposals about what
to do, and although these men had the common experience of the
Revolutionary Era to unite them, they also had sectional, political,
religious, and local interests to divide them.
The men who gathered in Philadelphia thus faced a delicate and
complex set of political questions. On the one hand, they had to
empower a national government to deal with recurring problems
arising from the unique historical development of the United States.
The governments of the individual colonies had few connections with
one another prior to independence; they did not easily merge into a
United States, and in fact often looked jealously upon one another.
One set of issues revolved around replacing the functions the British
had served during the Colonial Era: i.e., national defense, diplomacy,
trade policy, taxation, the opening of new land or the creation of new
colonies. On the other hand, the national government had to respect
the autonomy of the individual states, recognize and mediate
differences among the states and their citizens, and develop
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962) (“The conception of political
equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”).
6 MARGO ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 7–20 (1988)
[hereinafter ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS].
4
5
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mechanisms to apportion power and tax burdens among the
constituent elements of the United States. Revising the national
government or devising a new one would be no easy matter. Several
prior efforts had failed. Contemporaries might well have expected the
men to disband with little accomplished at the end of the summer.
We know now that did not happen; their deliberations resulted in a
fundamentally new and breathtakingly radical governmental structure,
which we have lived with ever since. Unlike the Articles, which
mandated a one house Congress and no executive branch, the
Constitution created three branches of government: executive,
legislative and judicial. The legislature was bicameral, with the lower
house apportioned among the states according to population and
elected by the people, the upper house apportioned among the states
and elected by the state legislatures. The executive branch was headed
by a President elected by the people through the mechanism of the
Electoral College. The new system increased the power of the
national government considerably, yet it was also full of checks and
balances to guarantee the powers of the states and citizens and to
protect against the kind of tyranny the Crown had exercised.
The complex and relatively explicit structures, the detailed
enumeration and delegation of powers, and the system of checks and
balances were all mechanisms intended to foster both “a more perfect
union” (national unification) and the rights of the individual states. So
also was the institution of a decennial census to measure the relative
strength of the various elements of the population and periodically
readjust the relative power of the states and local areas in the national
government. Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution created the House
of Representatives, and defined its membership and capacities.7
Paragraph three of section 2 specified that the representatives and
direct taxes were to be “apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective
numbers.”8
This simple language provided the solution to one of the
fundamental political controversies of the revolutionary era: namely
how to allocate representation fairly in legislative assemblies. Before
the Revolution, the colonists had protested their lack of representation
in the British Parliament. The newly united thirteen colonies also
struggled over the problem of the equitable distribution of the burdens
and resources of the national government among large and small
states. Critics had charged that the Articles of Confederation were an
7
8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
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unsatisfactory grounding for a national government precisely because
states voted as units, regardless of their disparate wealth or
populations.
The 1787 Constitution allocated representation in the House
according to population and in the Senate by state. Since direct taxes
were also to be allocated according to population, the large states
would gain House representation but incur a higher potential tax
burden to the federal government. The strength of each state in the
Electoral College would be determined by summing the state’s Senate
and House members. Finally, the census was to be taken every ten
years since the framers were well aware that populations—especially
the American population—grew and shifted over time.
The logic of the census system flowed from the experience and
conceptions of the framers. The Founding Fathers debated other
methods of allocating political power and tax capacity during the
Philadelphia Convention. They discussed apportionments based upon
land assessments, other measures of wealth, and population. They
agreed that, theoretically, political power should be allocated on the
basis of population and that tax capacity derived from wealth.
Everyone agreed, however, that population was much easier to
measure than wealth and that wealth was highly correlated with
population. So, population would be the apportionment measure. The
new census and apportionment mechanisms of the federal constitution
were thus a crucial piece of the Great Compromise among the large
and small states which made a national government possible. The
periodic changes that had to take place to account for population
growth and change were assigned to an automatic decennial routine,
separated from the cycles of more frequent elections for House,
Senate, and the Presidency, which were also designed to shift power
among the constituent elements of the population.
But there was one fly in the ointment that would come back to
haunt the Framers in future years and that is of particular relevance.
That was the question of defining exactly who was part of the
“population” deserving the right to political participation in the
society and owing responsibility to pay taxes to the state. The
fundamental thrust of the discussion in the Constitutional Convention
was to use the most expansive rule possible, including, for example,
women, children, and the poor in the count, though they neither voted
nor were necessarily responsible as individuals for taxes. The rub
came when the Framers considered how to treat slaves and Indians.
Should the southern states, for example, be granted political
representation for their slaves? At the time southerners considered
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slaves “property” for purposes of tax assessments but did not count
slaves when they apportioned their state legislatures. The double rule
of using the same measure for representation and taxation broke down
logically for slaves. Further, should Indians, who were generally
considered outside the purview of the American polity and as
members of foreign states, be counted for representation and
taxation?
The solution to these dilemmas was to hedge the universal rule of
counting the population for apportionment with two provisos. The
census clause in Article I, section 2, paragraph 3, continued: the
“respective Numbers [of the population] . . . shall be determined by
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons.”9 The Three-Fifths Compromise required
the census to count slaves separately so that the slave population
could be discounted to three-fifths of the value of the free population
for apportionment allocations. The second proviso eliminated
“Indians not taxed” from the census altogether. Only people who
came to be called “civilized Indians” were to be included in the
decennial census count, and hence the apportionment totals. 10
Two points should be made about these constitutional provisions.
First, the Framers recognized that the numeric decision of the threefifths rules was arbitrary and only justified as a compromise
necessary to move the overall constitutional revision process forward.
Second, and relatedly, the Framers defined the population to be
included or excluded, counted as whole people or as three-fifths of a
person, according to the person’s civil status. To avoid ambiguity, the
Constitution even clarified that unfree indentured servants, that is,
“those bound to Service for a term of Years,” were to be included in
the “free Persons.”11 Nowhere did the Constitution mention a racial
classification, and, in fact, the Framers used the ambiguous “other
persons” to define “slave.”12 But as the census was implemented, and
in popular discourse, Americans translated the variable names listed
on the census form to the racial attributes of “white,” “black,”
“colored,” and “Indian” and ultimately replaced the civil statuses of
free, slave, and “Indians not taxed.”

9
10
11
12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Demographic History
Today, the principle of representative democracy is a generally
accepted one, and nations around the world take periodic censuses. A
census seems a fairly obvious tool to use to apportion political power
among a set of constituencies. Yet the United States was the first
nation in the world to institute a regular population count to apportion
political power. The principles that political power was a function of
population and that population could be measured were truly
innovative in the eighteenth century and only proved to be lasting as
they were implemented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Moreover, the census might well have been a rather minor
constitutional innovation were it not for the extraordinary
demographic character of the American population.13 The United
States has had one of the most heterogeneous and demographically
dynamic populations in the history of the world. In the past three
centuries, the colonies and the United States have seen rapid
population growth, major migrations, and sharp demographic
transitions—all in the context of a racially and ethnically
heterogeneous population. In 1700, about 250,000 people lived in the
colonies. By the time of the Revolution the population was over two
million. The first census counted 3.9 million people. The current
population is roughly 310 million. The current land area of the
country is four times the size of the nation in 1790; the population is
almost eighty times larger. In 1850, the country was 85 percent rural;
now it is 80 percent urban. From 1700 to the Civil War, the American
population grew at the rate of 30-35 percent per decade. From 18601910 it grew about 24 percent per decade; since then it has grown
about 10-13 percent per decade. The median age of the population has
increased greatly. In the early nineteenth century, it was around
sixteen, reflecting the high birth rates and shorter expectation of life
of the times. Now it is around thirty-seven. In the early nineteenth
century, a child could expect to live about to the age of forty; now, a
child will live for about seventy-eight years.
The United States’ population was and remains racially and
ethnically diverse. At the first census about a fifth of the population
were African or African-American and primarily slaves. The larger
majority was free and “white”—primarily from the British Isles.
Although slavery ended during the tumultuous Civil War of the midnineteenth century, racial distinctions continue to be major social
13 MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS OF
CENSUS––TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14–17 (2001) [hereinafter ANDERSON &
FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?].
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markers in American society. Currently about 12 percent of the
population is black; 16 percent is Hispanic/Latino. The non-Hispanic
white population is slated to decline to 45 percent by 2050.14
Between 1820 and 1980, fifty million immigrants came to the
United States in search of jobs and a new life. During the years of the
major European migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, 13-15 percent of the population was foreign born. This
proportion fell to 5 percent by 1970, and with the surge in
immigration in the past generation has risen again to 12 percent
foreign-born. Finally, the American population was and is regionally
heterogeneous. For example, currently 80 percent of the population is
urban. However, in eighteen states over 80 percent of the population
is urban; in another four states the population is over 50 percent rural.
Seven states (all in the South) are more than one-fifth black; in
nineteen states, the black population is less than 5 percent.
These dramatic patterns make the decennial census and its
apportionments major social, political, and intellectual events.
Americans are accustomed to major demographic changes each
decade and look to the census for their evidence. Census-based
apportionments are supposed to take some very difficult questions
about the distribution of political power and economic resources off
the immediate legislative agenda and consign them to predetermined
allocations. Yet, because so much is at stake, the census and the
decennial process of reapportionment and redistricting is subject to
massive political maneuvering to maintain or advance political power
within the context of the constitutional framework. The census
numbers themselves are subject to incredible scrutiny and analysis, as
each decade Congress, state legislatures, and other governmental
bodies redistribute legislative seats, tax revenue, and grants-in-aid on
the basis of the population-based apportionment formulas. By
definition for every gainer in the reapportionment game, there must
be a loser and thus the process, though necessary, is politically
delicate and painful to the losers. Americans have not always agreed
on whether the demographic changes in the population are good or
bad, implying “progress” and “manifest destiny” or “degradation” and
“race suicide.” Accordingly, the development of the census itself as a
more elaborate and more scientific count each decade and the
development of the art and science of redistricting are intimately
bound up with the political and social history of the nation.
14 This material draws largely from ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. CENSUS: FROM THE
CONSTITUTION TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (ACS) (Margo J. Anderson, Constance
F. Citro & Joseph J. Salvo eds., Sage CQ Press 2d ed. 2012).
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C. Implementing the Constitutional Provisions
I have written extensively elsewhere about the history of the
implementation of the Census Clause and reapportionment and
redistricting process.15 For our purposes today, suffice it to say that
the Framers recognized very early that the constitutional language
was only a starting point for clarifying how to make the decennial
process function. A few examples should suffice to illustrate the
point.
The constitutional language did not prescribe how Congress was
actually supposed to calculate the apportionment “according to their
respective numbers.”16 Congress recognized by 1792 that there were
many possible legitimate formulas for the calculation and that
different formulas produced different political outcomes. That fact led
Washington to use the presidential veto for the first time to settle the
dispute after the 1790 census.
State government officials recognized that they could construct
legislative districts for their party’s political advantage by the 1810
Census, and the term “gerrymander” was coined by the Boston
Gazette to name this new political innovation.
As new states were admitted to the union, the rapid population
growth and westward expansion of the population in the nineteenth
century prompted Congress to increase the size of the House of
Representatives. As the House size expanded, the states formed from
the original thirteen colonies lost the capacity to control the House of
Representatives or the votes in the Electoral College. Most
importantly, the greater differential population growth in the North
threatened the future of the slave economy of the Southern states. As
one commentator put it, “the laws of population are themselves
abolitionists.” 17 That the Southern states seceded from the union
weeks after the 1860 census results and the allocations for the next
congressional reapportionment were published is not an accident.
After the Civil War, urbanization and industrialization, particularly
in northern and midwestern states, shifted political power to the cities,
home to what rural Protestant Americans saw as the nation’s
concentration of immigrants, social disorder, Catholics, and corrupt
urban political bosses. These “people,” rural Americans claimed,
should not be represented in Congress or permitted to become citizens
and vote. When the results of the 1920 Census were published,
15 See, e.g., ANDERSON, AMERICAN C ENSUS, supra note 6; ANDERSON & FIENBERG,
WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13.
16 U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, para. 3.
17 ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 57.
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Congress found, for the only time in the history of the republic, that it
could not muster a majority to pass a reapportionment bill.
In other words, population counting, reapportionment, and
redistricting have never been simple, automatic, non-political
processes. Rather they have always been intimately tied up with the
larger political and social controversies of the day and have
sometimes served to resolve, and sometimes served to exacerbate,
those controversies.
D. The Corrupt Bargain of the 1920s
For our purposes, the roots of the Baker v. Carr decision and the
Reapportionment Revolution of the past half century lie in the
apportionment controversies of the 1920s.18 Congress faced several
dilemmas at the time, which raised again the ambiguities in the
original constitutional apportionment mandate. First, Congress
decided in 1910 to stop the growth in the size of the House. Thus, the
1920 reapportionment would have to be a true zero-sum game; one
state’s gain would be another state’s loss. Second, several
mathematicians produced competing apportionment methodologies,
which had the effect of producing different allocations for key states.
Third, the demographic trends evident in the 1920 Census results
were not to the liking of the Republican majority in Congress. The
census results showed major shifts in population to the cities, to the
far west, to places in the country populated by immigrants. The
census, critics held, had to be wrong. So leaders proposed and failed
to pass bill after bill until, by the late 1920s, key Congressional
leaders proposed an automatic mechanism to go into place after the
1930 Census. This bill passed in June 1929. To secure passage,
Congress removed the mandate—in every apportionment bill since
1840—that required Congressional districts to be compact and
contiguous and equally sized as nearly as possible within states.
Congress, in other words, reapportioned power among the states, but
quietly acquiesced to rural malapportionment within states. States
with growing urban populations would gain seats, but those seats
would not necessarily be allocated to urban districts.
The Census Bureau reported the 1930 Census results in December.
The numbers were indeed stark. Twenty-one states would lose
twenty-seven seats in the House; eleven other states would gain them.
California's delegation grew from eleven to twenty; Michigan's from
thirteen to seventeen. Texas gained three seats; New York, New
18

ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 149–58.
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Jersey and Ohio, two each. After twenty years, Congress was
reapportioned.
But the last word was not quite in. In 1932, Stewart Broom of
Mississippi sued the state for violating the usual districting
requirements of equality of size, and contiguity and compactness of
territory in its redistricting after the 1930 Census. Broom claimed that
the state had not followed the Congressional guidelines in laying out
the new districts. The Court searched the legislative history of the
reapportionment law and concluded that “[i]t was manifestly the
intention of the Congress not to reenact the provision as to
compactness, contiguity, and equality in population with respect to
the districts to be created pursuant to the reapportionment under the
Act of 1929.”19 It was, in short, perfectly legal to create
gerrymandered and malapportioned Congressional districts.
By the early 1930s, former U.S. Census official Walter Willcox
pointed out, the size of New York's Congressional districts varied by
a factor of 7.8. The largest district contained 799,407 people; the
smallest 90,671. Congress had found a conservative backwardlooking solution to the “problem” of the rise of new constituencies of
the urban industrial society. They changed the rules of the
apportionment game to preserve rural and small-town dominance of
legislative halls for another generation. “These actions eventually
precipitated another reapportionment crisis, the ‘reapportionment
revolution’ of the 1960s.”20 Between the late 1920s and the 1960s,
despite increasingly obvious malapportionment of Congress and state
legislatures, reapportionment was not a burning political issue.
Several factors drove it from the public agenda. First, and most
obviously, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929–1930 raised a
new and frightening set of questions about the viability of the modern
American economy which pushed many of the pressing issues of the
1920s off the legislative agenda. Immigration restriction seemed
unnecessary if a depressed economy no longer attracted migrants.
Prohibition appeared to be a foolish crusade. Government policy
makers, like the population generally, struggled to cope with mass
unemployment and the collapse of the locally based social welfare
system, a farm crisis, and the collapse of the most prosperous sectors
of industry. In the face of the Depression, malapportioned legislatures
were simply not important.
Second, numerical apportionment mechanisms are supposed to
depoliticize the periodic allocation and transfer of power and
19
20

Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932).
ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 157.
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resources among the elements of the population—in this case among
the states. They are designed to take these questions off the current
policy agenda and consign them to “automatic” allocations. This is
not to say that such apportionment mechanisms are “fair” or
politically “neutral.” It is to reiterate the conclusions that the Framers
drew from their experience in developing original constitutional
provisions, particularly the Three–Fifths Compromise: an imperfect
but workable apportionment rule is better than no rule at all.
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION AND THE CENSUS
My second task is to examine what happened when federal and
state officials in charge of reapportionment and redistricting, and
officials in the Census Bureau, confronted the data demands of the
reapportionment decisions.
In 1962, the Supreme Court ruled that malapportioned state
legislatures were unconstitutional and opened the way for the decade
of lawsuits that led to the “Reapportionment Revolution” of the
sixties. For forty years the federal courts, and particularly the
Supreme Court, had refused to rule on apportionment cases. The
courts had argued that legislative apportionment was strictly a
legislative matter. In 1962, the Supreme Court changed its position
and ruled, in Baker v. Carr, that the Tennessee legislature had to be
reapportioned. A series of cases followed which overthrew
apportionments in other legislatures and in Congress. By 1964 the
phrase “one person, one vote”21 had entered the nation’s political
vocabulary to define the new principle of legislative apportionment.
Relatedly, the Voting Rights Act of 196522 enforced the mandate
in the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution requiring that the
“right . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”23 Congress created clear numerical tests of compliance
with the constitutional goals of voting rights. As written in the
original 1965 provision, for example, if a state used a literacy test for
voter registration, and if voter registration or turnout was less than
fifty percent of the voting age population of a jurisdiction, then the
law presumed a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In such a case,
the literacy tests were suspended, and the Justice Department could
send federal registrars and election observers to monitor elections.
21 Cf. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381 (“The conception of political equality . . . can mean only one
thing—one person, one vote.”).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa–6 (2006).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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Such jurisdictions also had to “preclear” any new voting
qualifications with the Attorney General of the United States. At the
time, six southern states came under these rules; counties in several
other states were also affected.
The Court’s decisions and the language of the Voting Rights left
much of the implementation of the electoral changes to be worked out
in practice. There were myriad issues to be resolved from the
sweeping mandates of the 1960s. And one of those issues was a new
requirement for good quality census data.
A. The Census in the Limelight
It is fairly clear that in the 1960s, neither Congress nor the courts
had spent much time considering the data issues of implementation of
the reapportionment decisions. At the time, census data seemed to be
as reliable as an old shoe, simply there for use, an uncontroversial and
ordinary resource for all parties to use. In fact, however, census data
are themselves the products of enormous administrative, scientific,
and political decision making. Neither the leadership in the Census
Bureau, nor their existing data tabulation programs, were prepared to
address the data requirements of the reapportionment revolution.
They were unprepared precisely because for the previous forty years,
malapportionment of legislative districts was seen as normal, and thus
the Bureau put very little effort into producing and delivering data for
political use. Instead, the agency had addressed data production for
other pressing social and economic issues, and was proud of its
accomplishments.
From the 1930s through the early 1960s, the Census Bureau
pioneered in the development of new methods and new data to
measure the capacities of a modern industrial economy.24 In so doing,
the agency recruited a cadre of professional statisticians who became
increasingly important in the federal statistical system. For much of
the period, monitoring, analyzing and providing data to address the
dislocations of the Great Depression was the major challenge. The
1930 census was taken less than six months after the stock market
crash. As the Depression tightened its grip on the nation, the Census
Bureau found itself drawn into a contentious debate about the scope
and character of unemployment, and thus the causes of the economy’s
slide. The Bureau leadership was sympathetic with then President
Herbert Hoover’s stance toward unemployment, and thus the Bureau
figures from the 1930 Census and a special 1931 Census of
24

ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 159–90.
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unemployment put the best face on what clearly was a dramatic rise
in unemployment nationally. Democratic claims that the Depression
was deepening were overstated, Census officials claimed.
Unemployment always existed, especially during the winter and early
spring months when the census was historically taken. As it turned
out, Herbert Hoover’s evaluation of the depth of the Depression and
the appropriate way to cope with it was soundly rejected by the voters
in 1932. In the spring of 1933, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Dealers
came to town intent on remaking American government and society
and ending the Depression. The Census Bureau came in for particular
scrutiny, as one of Hoover's favorite agencies, and—with the
exception of the Wilson years—as a longtime Republican
stronghold.25
Revitalizing the Census Bureau in the mid-1930s was no easy task.
Throughout the 1930s, committees of statisticians, economists, and
other academics—most notably the Committee on Government
Statistics and Information Services (COGSIS)—investigated Bureau
practices and found them wanting. Officials from Roosevelt's
alphabet agencies called upon the Bureau to provide data on the
socioeconomic situation of the population. Congress built the grantin-aid system to allocate tax money from the federal to state and local
governments, and they sought population data on poverty, income
distributions, migration. Yet the Census Bureau of the early 1930s
had yet to devise a credible measure of unemployment, had no data
on income and did not measure poverty. The New Dealers
persevered, and by the end of the decade, proposed the introduction of
sample surveys to measure unemployment, reorganized the agency’s
bureaucratic structure, increased the statistical training of employees,
built a research unit and analyzed and revamped classification
systems. Many of these innovations became part of the 1940 Census.
The Sixteenth Census of 1940 included a probability sample for the
first time, a housing census and evaluation studies to measure
systematically the level of accuracy of the enumeration, the tabulation
and coding procedures, coding bias, and sampling error.
25 For example, an examination of the leadership of the agency reveals the political
dynamics. In 1933, Director William Mott Steuart resigned and was replaced by William Lane
Austin. Assistant Director Joseph Hill, then in his seventies, who had first worked on the census
in 1900, was transferred to a newly created “research” position. American Statistical
Association President Stuart A. Rice replaced Hill as Assistant Director. Rice, then a sociology
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, intended to stay in government for a year or so. “He
ultimately remained as a major figure in the federal statistical system until 1954—at the Census
Bureau, then on the Central Statistical Board and finally in the Division of Statistical Standards
in the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget).” ANDERSON &
FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13, at 28.
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During the World War II years, the research work measuring
unemployment produced the ongoing Current Population Survey.
Computerization and data automation followed with UNIVAC and
FOSDIC in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, the Bureau
began the mail census, replacing the time-honored method of using
in-person enumerators for the decennial count. In conjunction with
local jurisdictions, mostly large cities, the Bureau instituted programs
in producing “small area data,” initially census tracts and, in some
areas, using “blocks” or the new “zip code” as tabulation areas.
B. Data Needs for Redistricting
Nevertheless, the apportionment decisions presented challenges
that the innovations of the previous forty years did not address. The
first problem was geographic. Many states had simply stopped
redistricting altogether, or used existing civil divisions as geographic
building blocks, regardless of population size and change.
Meanwhile, the Census Bureau advanced its geography program
primarily to serve the administration of the census. From the Bureau’s
perspective, definitions were required for two different types of
geography, what came to be called enumeration or collection
geography and tabulation geography. Enumeration geography was
defined to facilitate the census count. Enumeration districts were
districts where an enumerator could walk from house to house and
were roughly defined to be of sufficiently equal size to facilitate the
enumeration. Until the 1980s, the Census Bureau also recreated the
entire geographic mapping process each decade, using prior
geography as a guide.
Tabulation geography is quite a different system. This is the spatial
definition of reporting places, e.g., the regions, states, counties, town,
cities, minor civil divisions and so on, for which the Census Bureau
tabulates the results of the census. Some, such as state boundaries, are
fairly fixed. But most tabulation geography can change, as local
jurisdictions annex, consolidate, split, or generally refigure their
jurisdictions. During the data tabulation process after the census
information is collected, person and household information collected
by enumeration geography is aggregated up or transferred to the
tabulation geography codes for data publication.26
26 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PHC80–R–2A, 1980,
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, HISTORY, PART A, 3–1–3–39 (1986), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpop802unse_bw.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CPH–R–2C, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING, HISTORY, PART C, 3–17 (1995).
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Thus as the Census Bureau and the state and local government
officials charged with redistricting confronted the data issues
presented by the new mandates for one person, one vote, they found
themselves scrambling for solutions. During the planning phase for
the 1970 Census, the issues came into sharp focus. First, officials
discovered that comprehensive liaison arrangements between states,
local jurisdictions, and the Census Bureau that might address the data
issues presented by the new mandates for one person, one vote, did
not exist. Whose responsibility was it to set standards for fifty
different states? Who provided training in data use? How did one ask
for more or different data? Who paid for it?
Second, what data did the Census Bureau have at hand that could
be used immediately for the redistricting required after the 1970
Census? The redistricters very quickly began to define what they
wanted from the Census Bureau, and four criteria for “good data”
emerged. First, the data would have to be reported at very low levels
of geography to serve as building blocks for legislative districts.
Second, such data should be accessible and easy for the redistricters
to use. Third, it needed to be timely, e.g., available in the year after
the census so the redistricters could meet the deadlines for the next
Congressional election cycle. And fourth, it needed to be
disaggregated by race for Voting Rights Act enforcement.
It quickly became clear that the Census Bureau did not have an
existing data tabulation program that would serve these purposes for
the nation as a whole. For some states and jurisdictions, tract or block
level data tabulations existed, developed over the previous half
century in conjunction with cities and states for urbanized and
metropolitan areas. But though these programs covered roughly 60
percent of the nation’s population, they covered only 2 percent of the
national geography and could not rapidly be expanded to the
remaining states and jurisdictions.
The Census Bureau’s solution to the immediate problem after the
1970 Census was to provide redistricters with the “Master
Enumeration District List (MEDList) and census maps,” in other
words, with data aggregated by enumeration or collection geography,
not tabulation geography. These lists and maps contained population
and housing counts with comprehensive coverage of the geography of
the state for all jurisdictions, as well as census tract and blocks where
applicable. But as the Census Bureau acknowledged, “Many States
experienced problems in using the MEDList and maps in relation to
their election or legislative areas because the boundaries of the census
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entities often did not coincide with the State or local voting district
boundaries.”27
C. PL94-171
Between 1972 and 1975, therefore, Congress, the Census Bureau,
and state and local officials began a dialog about what to do after the
1980 Census. The Reapportionment Task Force of the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the Census Bureau
began working on data improvements. NCSL conducted surveys.
Congress and local government organizations held public hearings
and began to draft legislation to amend Title XIII28 to address the new
mandates. By 1974, solutions began to emerge in legislative
language. The House passed bills in 1973 and 1974. The Census
Bureau expressed concern about elements of the language,
particularly that the proposed eight month time frame for reporting
the data was too stringent. In late 1975, Congress passed HR1753,
which was signed into law in December as PL94-171. The law
authorized a process for states to cooperate with the Census Bureau in
defining the geographic areas for which they would receive small area
population counts for redistricting. The law set a deadline of one year
after the census date, that is, April 1 of the year after the census, for
the Bureau to provide the tabulations to the states. The law itself did
not specify a particular level of geographic detail, but stakeholders
clearly preferred the smallest possible tabulation area, such as the
block, because larger geographies were harder to map to existing
local jurisdictions. It was generally possible to aggregate blocks up to
wards, for example, but it was not easy to figure out how to split
population in an enumeration district that crossed two or more wards.
At the time, block-level geography was defined for about 2.5 million
27 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
REFERENCE
MANUAL
14–3
(1994),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/GARMcont.pdf; see generally Tabulation of
Population for Purposes of Apportionment of State Legislative Bodies: Hearing on H.R. 1753
Before the Subcomm. on Census and Population, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (noting that states have
faced a number of problems in attempting to work with the data presently available from the
Bureau; for example, the enumerated districts are too large to be effectively used by officials in
their legislative redistricting and there are difficulties in defining boundaries of enumerated
districts); Tabulation of Population for Purposes of Apportionment of State Legislative Bodies:
Hearing on H.R. 9290 Before the Subcomm. on Census and Statistics, 93d Cong. 1–2 (1973)
(noting that states have difficulty in using the Bureau’s census figures in states’ apportionment
of legislative bodies); U. S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DESIGNING P.L. 94–
171 REDISTRICTING DATA FOR THE YEAR 2010 CENSUS 5–8 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/DesignPL94-171.pdf (discussing state and local official use of
the 1970 census data).
28 13 U.S.C. §§ 1–79 (2006).
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entities in urban and metropolitan areas, covering approximately 60
percent of the population but only 2 percent of the country’s land
area. The new law would raise the question about how and whether to
map the remaining land area and population into small area entities.
The goals of PL94-171 were partially achieved for the 1980
Census round. All or part of twenty-three states worked with the
Census Bureau to customize their data requirements for voting or
election district data. The states received block level data where
available and enumeration district data where finer tabulations were
not designated. Given the technological capacities of the time, the
data and maps were delivered on paper, computer tape, and
microfiche. The variables available on the 1980 file for each
geographic unit were total population broken into five race groupings
and Hispanic/Latino.29
After the 1980 Census round, the Bureau and the stakeholders
from states and local governments committed to improving the
program for the next census. The Bureau also committed during the
1980s to building the TIGER/MAF system, a national digitized map
linked to all addresses in the nation. Computerized geographic
information system technologies were also developed during the
1980s, making it possible to move the data distribution process from
paper and microfiche to electronic media. These new technologies in
conjunction with continued cooperation with state and local
governments on small area and block-level mapping, permitted the
1990 Census PL94-171 data to provide comprehensive small area
data for redistricting in the entire nation.
At the 1990 Census, the Bureau expanded the variables to be
published in the PL94-171 files to include a breakdown of the
population of an area by total and voting age population, e.g.,
eighteen and over, and it produced block-level data for the entire
nation, some seven million blocks. With the expansion of the program
in 1990 and the new GIS technology, which permitted digital
mapping of these data, not only did the data facilitate ever more
elaborate mapmaking for legislative districts, it also facilitated the
visualization of detailed race and ethnic distributions for every place
in the nation. Newspaper accounts of changes in the white, black, etc.
population for a local area, which up to 1980 had to be hand drawn by
a cartographer, usually using census tract data (where it existed), were
suddenly possible with block level distinctions for the nation as a
29 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PHC80–R–2D, 1980 CENSUS
POPULATION AND HOUSING, HISTORY, PART D, 8–29 (1989), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu802uns_bw.pdf.
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whole and began to appear in every local newspaper, book or
magazine with access to reasonably powerful desktop software.30
The average population of a census block is about thirty-five
people. The next larger census reporting unit, the block group, has an
average population size of around 1200. There are over 200,000 such
units in the nation. To put the matter another way, the average block
group contains thirty-five blocks, and thirty-five times more people
than a block. If one divides the block population by race, voting age,
and ethnicity, empty or extremely small data cells predominate. In
2000 and 2010, the reporting detail in the PL94-171 files expanded
once again, as the racial classifications expanded to include results for
people who checked more than one race, creating dozens more data
cells per block.
As long as the tabulation blocks in the PL 94-171 files were seen
as simple building blocks, namely units to be aggregated up for
redistricting, the small size of the individual block might seem
innocuous. But there was one parallel but unexpected result of the
PL94-171 program, namely the status of the accuracy of the block
level data, that is, whether the small count for an individual block was
in some sense “true,” e.g., an accurate reflection of the population of
the local area, both in size, and by age and race/ethnicity distribution.
Were there really forty-seven white persons of voting age in a
particular block? Did it matter if the number was fifty-three or
twenty-nine? Or if the persons were “really” of a different race or
ethnic group? Or if thirty-eight of the forty-seven “really” should
have been counted in a different block, because the geocoding of the
census results was flawed? That question emerged in the context of
another population counting issue of the past half century, namely the
accuracy of the census enumeration itself.
D. Census Undercount
During the 1930s and 1940s, as part of the general trend in
statistical innovation at the Census Bureau, statisticians began their
first systematic efforts to measure census accuracy.31 Ever since
George Washington had complained in the 1790s, officials had been
concerned about undercounting the population. And over the years
many local officials had objected to their census counts. In response,
officials had worked to improve the counting process to minimize
errors, be they what came to be called undercounts, overcounts,
30 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CPH–R–2C,
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, HISTORY, PART C, 3–1–3–10 (1995).
31 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13, at 3–53.
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miscounts, padding, or curbstoning. The growth of other large scale
administrative population data systems—vital records and public
health data in particular—and the development of the disciplines of
demography and statistics prompted a new set of questions. On one
hand, these other data systems sometimes generated alternative
estimates of the population or segments of it. On the other,
demographers and statisticians needed census counts for the
denominators for their rate calculations or as sampling frames for
other studies. Accordingly, both the professional community of
statisticians and demographers and census officials began to conceive
of measuring census accuracy precisely for particular segments of the
population.
The issue began to be framed precisely after a somewhat
serendipitous natural experiment in 1940. The selective service
registration of October 1940 allowed demographers to compare the
April 1940 census counts of men of draft age (twenty-one to thirtyfive) with the counts of men who registered for the draft. As Daniel
O. Price reported in his article on the subject, nationally, the census
under reported about 3 percent of the men in the age cohort since the
draft registration recorded some 453,000 more men than the census
did. More significantly, though, was the finding that the level of the
undercount varied by region and race. Some 13 percent of the black
men of draft age were missed in the census. Nationally, 229,000 more
black men registered for the draft than would have been expected
from the census estimate. Price also demonstrated that the black men
registered for the draft in dramatically higher numbers in urban states
than would have been expected from the April census counts. He
could not, however, determine if such men had migrated to an urban
area between the time of the census and the registration date, or
whether the census did a poorer job of counting urban residents. Price
concluded his article by discussing some of the implications of his
findings, particularly that the standard indicators of vital rates, such as
death rates, would have to be recalculated in light of these data.32
Additional studies followed in later years. In 1955, Ansley Coale,
as part of the general project of developing a definitive demographic
analysis of the American population, published a “revision of census
figures'” by “age, sex, and color” for 1950. Coale's elaborate iterative
technique used age cohort data by race and sex from the 1930, 1940
and 1950 Censuses to estimate the size of each cohort for each year,
adjusted by aging the population forward each decade and correcting
for deaths and immigration. Coale estimated a net census undercount
32

ANDERSON & FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13, at 29–30.
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of about 2.5 percent. He also concluded that the census undercounted
“nonwhites” dramatically—by 11 percent in 1950. Again, his
“revisions” were in service of his larger demographic project so he
ended his analysis by producing revised data by race, sex and age for
use by demographers.33
In the 1950s, the Census Bureau also began evaluation studies of
undercounts as part of their larger evaluation program. One research
thrust employed the methods “demographic analysis” as the
techniques used by Coale and Price came to be called. Information
from earlier censuses and other population data sources were
compared with the aggregate population counts for particular cohorts
of the population. A researcher might compare the data from cohorts
organized by age, race, sex, region in two sources and calculate
estimates of the differences for each cohort. The corrected cohorts
were then reaggregated to generate an overall estimate of the
accuracy of the count.
Demographic analysis as a technique has the advantage of being
relatively easy to undertake. The researcher may have to make a very
large number of individual cohort analyses. A matrix based upon, for
example, two sex categories, fifteen five-year age cohorts, two racial
groups (white/nonwhite), in two data systems generated 120
individual cohort estimates. Price’s selective service/1940 Census
comparison generated ninety-eight cohort estimates of undercount,
that is, for the two race categories, and the forty-eight states plus the
District of Columbia. Nevertheless, once the appropriate data are
available, the analysis is relatively straightforward.
The disadvantage of demographic analysis is its inability to
pinpoint exactly why the undercount (or overcount) exists. As an
aggregate methodology, it cannot identify which particular
individuals were missed, nor can it provide more specific information
on the sources of undercount beyond the information available from
the original cohort variables.
To overcome these disadvantages, the Census Bureau developed
new techniques, particularly the post enumeration survey (PES). After
the 1950 Census, the Bureau undertook a sample re-enumeration of
the country to try to identify households missed by the enumerators,
household members who were not reported within households, as
well as other classification and categorization errors in the original
enumeration. The survey used trained interviewers to improve the
quality of the information reported. The Bureau then matched the
information from the sample survey to the original census forms and
33

Id. at 30.
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developed estimates of the quality of the original count. Analysis of
the results again indicated an undercount and poorer coverage of the
nonwhite population.
By the time of the 1960 Census, census officials and the
community of professional demographers were well on their way to
understanding census undercounts. They built evaluations procedures
in the form of a post enumeration survey and demographic analysis
into the 1960 Census design. Professional discussions continued
quietly on the best means to estimate undercounts for particular
groups in the population, as well as to develop new census
methodologies to count better in the first place. These methodological
discussions are evident in the Bureau technical reports, and in the
general social science literature of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
What was still missing from the undercount discussion was any
sense that there were any larger political or social implications of the
undercount. From the 1940s through the mid-1960s, the literature was
totally “methodological”—of interest to demographers, statisticians
and survey researchers, but not to Congressmen, policymakers, or the
undercounted communities. This situation changed dramatically in
the mid-1960s.
The reapportionment decisions and the increasing use of federal
funds allocations based on population formulas propelled the census
undercount onto the political stage in the mid-1960s. In 1960, 15
percent of state and local funding came from federal aid. Once the
Supreme Court had invalidated the massive legislative
malapportionments of the past, the statisticians and politicians
realized that the census undercount also could have the effect of
denying representation to the uncounted. As with the new mandates
for small area data for redistricting, the Census Bureau found itself
facing new scrutiny and demands from state and local government
officials not just to measure, but to eliminate census undercount.
E. Improving the Accuracy of the Census
For most of the 1970s and 1980s, at the same time that the Bureau
was working to develop new technologies and data series to provide
small area data for redistricting, it was also embroiled in a complex
set of controversies about improving the accuracy of the count.
Congress, statisticians, local officials, and minority representatives
demanded that the Bureau count the population better. They also
began to ask why the Bureau could measure the level of the
undercount but could not correct for it in the published tabulations.
The Bureau responded by explaining the limits of demographic
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analysis, then the gold standard for undercount measurement. Critics
were not convinced and pointed out that the bureau was quite adept at
technical innovation. If it could pioneer in computer use and the
TIGER/MAF system, why could it not figure out how to correct for
census undercounts? When the prodding from congressional oversight
committees and public pressure did not seem to be yielding results,
local governments, particularly New York City, took the Commerce
Department to court to force the constitutional issues. The Bureau
successfully defended itself against fifty-four lawsuits after the 1980
Census.34
In the 1980s, statisticians and the Bureau began to develop new
methods to improve the count and to experiment with adjustment
methods to correct for undercounts. The budget for the census grew
dramatically. New advisory committees worked on the planning
efforts. By the late 1980s, the Bureau developed what it hoped would
be a statistically defensible method of adjusting the decennial census
for the undercount. The new design included a large post enumeration
survey with dual systems estimation to measure error in the census
enumeration, and a post stratification method to carry down the
corrected counts to the small geographic levels needed for
redistricting. In other words, as with the innovations spawned from
the passage of PL94-171, it looked at the time that the new
requirements for accurate small area data prompted by the
reapportionment decisions would also prompt the use of new methods
to measure accuracy in the count and correct for identifiable error.
It did not turn out that way. Undercount and error correction
seemed to all sides of the political spectrum to contain a partisan bias,
namely it would benefit areas that voted Democratic. Thus, the new
methods came under tremendous scrutiny, and that scrutiny quickly
took on a partisan cast. The Commerce Department of the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush administrations tried to cancel the new program
to measure and correct for undercount. In response, the City of New
York again sued, and the courts mandated that the new methods be
implemented in 1990. The post-enumeration survey program went
forward, but the decision whether to use the adjusted counts was
postponed until after the census. In 1991, the census director
recommended adjustment but the commerce secretary decided not to
adjust the 1990 Census results. Further litigation upheld the
secretary’s decision as within the scope of the Administrative
Procedures Act.35
34
35

Id. at 35–53.
See Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 4 (1996) (holding “Secretary’s
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The irony was that the court rulings ultimately depended on how
one evaluated the capacity of the program to correct for error at the
block level. Everyone conceded the small size the tabulation unit
increased the uncertainty of any block level count or estimate. Were
the unadjusted counts inviolable, as Republicans claimed, because the
supporters of adjustment could not prove they were more accurate at
the block level? Or should the adjusted block level tabulations be
used, as Democrats claimed, since when aggregated for legislative
districts they resulted in districts with less known bias deriving from
the census error?36
In the 1990s, Bill Clinton’s administration took the latter tack,
proposing a census design that included adjustment of the 2000
Census, including the apportionment counts. Republican members of
Congress sued to stop the Clinton plan. In Department of Commerce
v. United States House of Representatives,37 the Supreme Court ruled
that the current census statute prevented the use of sampling methods
for reapportioning congressional seats after the 2000 census. The
Census Bureau changed the design for the 2000 count so that the
remaining census results, including the redistricting data, could be
adjusted if the results indicated that adjusted data were more accurate.
In 2001, the Census Bureau decided against adjustment, and the
George W. Bush administration did not revive further efforts to adjust
census results for undercount or to plan for such an eventuality in the
2010 census.38
III. CURRENT STATUS OF CENSUS QUALITY
The statistical innovations of the post enumeration survey with
dual systems estimation were not implemented to adjust the census
for error. In 2000 innovations in the traditional census methodology,
notably better outreach and advertising and a sharply increased
budget, narrowed the level of the national undercount. These were
repeated in 2010. Evaluations of the accuracy of the 2010 count will
be published in 2012.
The latest evidence available of census accuracy is from the 2000
count. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel charged with

decision . . . conformed to applicable constitutional and statutory provisions”).
36 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13, at 77–99.
37 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
38 ANDERSON & FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13, at 291–304. For an example of
efforts to adjust census results for undercounting for the 2000 Census, see Dep’t of Commerce
v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 320 (1999), describing the Census Bureau’s
“plan to use two forms of statistical sampling” to capture undercounting.
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reviewing the 2000 census concluded that “net undercount rates
were . . . reduced in 2000” compared to 1990 and the differentials
between groups were also reduced.39 But they cautioned, “the 2000
census overcounted the total population” by 1.3 million people and
“differences in net undercount rates between such groups as
minorities and others and owners and renters remain.” And they
noted, “[c]ensus counts at the block level—whether adjusted or
unadjusted—are subject to high levels of error and hence should be
used only when aggregated to larger geographic areas.”40 The NAS
panel also recommended amending PL94-171:
The experience with the 2000 Accuracy and Coverage
Evaluation Program and the evaluation of census processes
and data content make clear that useful evaluation requires
considerable time. In particular, it appears difficult to
complete sufficiently comprehensive assessments of
population coverage and the quality of basic characteristics
by the currently mandated schedule for releasing block-level
census data for use in redistricting (which is 12 months after
Census Day).41
And they continued; “Congress should consider moving the deadline
to provide block-level census data for legislative redistricting to allow
more time for evaluation of the completeness of population coverage
and quality of the basic demographic items before they are
released.”42 The recommendation has yet to find supporters in
Congress.
In short, states will complete the 2010 decennial redistricting
round before the Census Bureau reports the level of bias and
inaccuracy in the 2010 results. It remains to be seen if that fact will
lead to further litigation or legislation.43
39 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 2000 CENSUS: COUNTING UNDER ADVERSITY
248 (Constance F. Citro, Daniel L. Cork & Janet L. Norwood eds., 2004).
40 Id. at 30.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 267.
43 On May 22, 2012, the Census Bureau reported the results of the post enumeration
survey to evaluate the accuracy of the 2010 census. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, NEWSROOM, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Undercount and Overcount in the
2010 Census (May 22, 2012) http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/
cb12-95.html; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PRESS KITS, CENSUS
COVERAGE
MEASUREMENT
(May
22,
2012)
http://2010.census.gov/news/presskits/ccm/ccm.html. The Bureau reported a net national overcount of .01 percent. This result was
not statistically significantly different from the results in 2000. The Bureau estimated 16 million
omissions in the household population, which were balanced by a roughly equal number of
“erroneous enumerations,” mostly duplicate enumerations. Thus a more rigorous measure of
accuracy called “gross error” (which adds the erroneous enumerations and the omissions) comes
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to over 10 percent of the household population of 300.7 million, though as of this date,
significant differential coverage does not appear to affect the uses of the data, including for
redistricting.
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